The case of Admiral Halsey
I took on a task of curiosity in an area I have already written about. It spurred other questions as well while researching this one. The first was the causes of WWII. It can be found here https://5280nup.wordpress.com/2022/02/21/why-japan-attacked/
The second question that crept in was how the war might have ended if we had to invade. It is found here https://wordpress.com/post/5280nup.wordpress.com/5089
Taffy 3 is a well-documented but under showcased battle of WWII. There are several questions I have concerning that battle. One of them I set out on a 1,400 plus page odyssey of exploration to gain insight into. Was Halsey culpable for the Center force ever reaching Taffy 3; the mystery and culpability of task force 34, the most famous task force that never was.
There are a few things that set the scene that are important to know and understand when seeking insight of the events:
Kinkaid was under MacArthur and responsible for the defense of the landings by ocean. He commanded the Heavy Metal of Ollendorf’s force and the Taffy forces, 1-3.
Halsey was under Nimitz and was there as an offensive force in case the bulk of the Japanese fleet showed up, specifically their fleet carriers.
Another important aspect of this battle to understand is that the center and southern forces were known to exist and were shadowed and in the center force’s case attacked somewhat effectively before surface action took place. The center force was known to have turned around. They were also reported to have turned forward again. I will distinguish the reason for that word distinctions.
BACKGROUND
On October 25, 1944, Taffy 3 staged a David VS Goliath defense of MacArthur’s return to the Philippines. It is historic. It was the most important event in Halsey’s career. Their efforts prevented the professional clash of the two largest egos of the Pacific.
The center force steaming south and meeting Taffy 3 was a surprise to everyone on the allied side and Taffy 3 was a surprise to Kurita, who was in command of the Center Force. When Taffy 3’s first morning anti-submarine flight saw and reported the approaching force from the north, he was asked to confirm. He did. He fired on them, and they on him. He stayed on station to give an account of the size of the force. It was overwhelming.
Adm Ziggy Sprague commanding Taffy 3 took both evasive action with his carriers and offensive in order to launch his planes. The launching necessitated the turning into the wind. Meanwhile, the Destroyers (DD) and Destroyer Escorts (DE) turned the other direction to obscure the running escort carriers (CVE) with smoke. The Japanese fleet was much faster than the CVEs and thus would run them down. This is why Adm Sprague set in motion the launch of all aircraft. He felt the assets could land elsewhere, after their home carriers were sunk.
This was one of the most telling early moments of the battle. Adm Sprague tried to delay contact with the approaching force so he could launch every plane, no matter its fuel or armament because he assumed the carriers’ lifespan was hours, or minutes. This is the essence of command; to make the most of any change in condition to either gain an advantage or minimize a loss. His situation was immediately a fighting retreat. He had no anticipation of such an encounter. He had no expectation of this battle. His role was to guard against submarines entering Leyte Gulf. He had become the last line of defense of a vastly larger and drastically better armed attacking force.
This is why when the first scouting plane that sighted the center force attacked, he dropped depth charges on a Battleship. That was what he was armed for. That’s what he was prepared for; Submarine attack. This is what the other planes of Taffy 3 and in fact all Taffys that day were equipped for. When other planes headed north to join in the attack, they too came equipped for either submarine attack or defense of those planes from air attack. Armor piercing bombs were not the plan of the day or the inventory on the CVEs. Some hardly had fuel as they were not yet fueled when launched in emergency.
The next moment of the battle that set a tone, belonged to Cdr Evans of the USS Johnson (DD). Soon after Adm Sprague gave the order for the ‘little guys’ to make smoke, he ordered all DDs and DEs to form a torpedo attack. They would have to follow Cdr Evans and the men of the USS Johnson. Evans had already given the order of the battle, “Right full Rudder, Flank Speed.” He had already started his torpedo run from the northern most point on the Taffy 3 defensive ring. He and his Destroyer he said would be a fighting ship, was running full speed into the Center Force, alone.
The USS Johnson was attacking the Center force alone.
I won’t go forth and tell the story of the attack blow by blow for it is very well documented and I highly recommend Last stand of the Tin Can Sailors by J Hornfischer. He is one of the sources for this writing. What’s most important to understand, is the courage that saved the day. This is the setting. This is the battlefield set by many people and many more decisions.
THE DATA
The Center Force had been attacked the previous day. For the first time a battleship, the Musashi, was sunk entirely by air power. This was one of the two most massive battleships the world has ever seen. The shots it fired in its own defense were some of its first and last. It never fired in an offensive capacity in spite of having the largest guns ever put to sea. This is worth noting because people today still debate the value of building more battleships. On that day, October 24,1944, the age of the battleship ended.
After this attack, and because of it, Kurita turned around. Almost all the attacking planes focused on the Musashi. It was a waste of resources. Had they focused on the Yamato as well, the Musashi’s sister ship, the force may have turned around and stayed turned. By misreports, the airmen reported that they had attacked both the Musashi and Yamato. They had not attacked the Yamato, at least not with any relevance. Instead, the forces overkilled one ship and sunk a couple others and thus allowed the still large center force to carry on. The misreporting of strikes and the severity of those strikes by the airmen was an endemic thing that lasted throughout the Pacific war.
When the Center Force had been spotted in the Sibuyan Sea and was attacked, a discussion took place about the defense of the San Bernadino Straight among Halsey’s command staff, including Halsey. At 3:12 PM on October 24th, Halsey transmitted that “(sic) Task force 34 will be formed under Vice Admiral Lee, commander Battle Line.” This was transmitted as a ‘battle plan’ and directed at six battleships, five cruisers, and fourteen destroyers throughout his own fleet. Its purpose was to engage decisively at long range. It was sent to all subordinate commanders and copied to Nimitz and Nimitz’s superior, Adm. King back in Washington DC.
Halsey later explained that this was a preparatory dispatch, or a warning order in case the opportunity to engage the enemy presented itself. This later clarification was offered only well after the battle. The transmission was not clarified at the time, other than a follow-up transmission on the TBS system. TBS stands for ‘Talk Between Ships’ and on low power. Only vessels nearby would receive this transmission. “If enemy sorties [through San Bernadino Straight], TF 34 will be formed when directed by me.
All of this is offered directly on page 237 of Ian Toll’s Twilight of the Gods which also sites CINCPAC Gray Book, Book 5, page 2242. Also Halsey, Admiral Halsey’s Story, p, 214.
At this point although he was under a different command than the defense of the landings which was Kinkaid, he assumed a role of defending the San Bernadino Straight, voluntarily. He stated, ‘will be formed’. This is the moment that changed everything in my research. This is the moment and his words, that changed his role in the battle that Taffy 3 would have to fight.
Admiral Kinkaid aboard the Wasatch heard the high power transmission and his communications center decoded it. This was done by all communications centers for all task forces. This was also done by Halsey’s own staff with all of Kinkaid and MacArthur’s transmissions.
Halsey had heard the contact reports in the south regarding the Southern Force, and believed it was a threat Kinkaid could handle. He also knew that after three days of shore bombardment in support of the landings, Adm Olendorf would be taking on the Southern Force in likely a battleship-to-Battleship action, at night. Due to the nature of his assignment that included a lot of shore bombardment, Adm. Olenforf’s ships would have a limited supply of armor piercing rounds. His mission and armaments were easily understood.
At 4:40pm on the 24th, one of Halsey’s scout planes spotted the Japanese Northern Force commanded by Ozawa. They were headed south towards Halsey. They were also running at a leisurely 15 knots. What was realized by the officers looking at the flag plot was, the three forces were all going at a timed speed which meant they were converging on a predetermined spot at a set time. Although at that time the reports were that the center force had turned, the Southern and Northern Forces were coming forward. Neither had been attacked significantly yet. Kinkaid was set to confront the Southern Force. That left the Northern Force to Halsey. Just as he had been seeking.
It is worth noting here that Halsey rotated his command with Adm Spruance. Spruance was his junior but they swapped time in command of the same fleet, simply changing designations and flags when doing so. In the previous stint as commander, Adm Spruance was almost within striking distance of the bulk of the Japanese fleet while he was on station off Saipan.
Spruance’s orders at the time were to defend the landings. He followed his orders. This angered Halsey when he had heard about it. Halsey had been outspoken about his anger at Spruance for not going after the Japanese fleet. Halsey also openly stated he would not let such an opportunity slip through his own fingers.
Within hours of the spotting of the Northern Force, but not connected, the Center Force turned northeast again on its original heading, aiming at the San Bernadino Straight. That night, the navigation lights for the straight lit up, indicating the fleet was headed through. One of the last scout planes before night operations reported this to Halsey’s 3rd fleet. He did not see the entire Center Force, only parts of it and the navigation lights. The turn, it’s spotting, and time are documented in every book I have read of the battle. The documenting of the navigation lights is detailed in Ian Toll’s book, Twilight of the Gods.
What happened next is likely the most important choices made in the battle. Adm Halsey lay down for much needed sleep as he had been up most of 48 hours. He had set his course and speed, headed almost due north, and would sleep while the Battleship New Jersey increased speed, seeking battle. The debates among his staff also started right away.
In the early years of the war, The US looked for and accepted equal or only slightly superior forces as a cause for confrontation. As long as we had a fighting chance, we took that chance and usually faired well. There had been no major naval encounter of the war we had not fought to at least a draw, other than Pearl Harbor. Since Guadalcanal, we had not lost a Naval encounter.
Halsey chose to take most of the 3rd fleet, to attack the Northern Force. The only part he did not take with him, was Adm. McCain’s battle group who were sent to Ulithi Atoll for replenishment. This meant he was taking three of his four battle groups north; 65 ships. The Northern Force consisted of 19 ships.
As the order to steam north was given and Halsey was headed to bed, he sent one last communicate to Kinkaid, “Proceeding north with three groups to attack at dawn.” No other information was sent from Halsey. It was not known if Kinkaid had been informed of the Northern Force. Kinkaid had no way of knowing Halsey had sent one of his battle groups to Ulithi Atoll. The only logical conclusion Kinkaid could draw was that the 4th battle group, Task Force 34 was guarding the San Bernardino Straight.
I find it hard to believe that the report from the northern spotter plane got to him and not the one from Sibuyan Sea. If both did and only one was valued, this would be cherry picking intelligence to meet an agenda. If only one did, then how? If it came in after Halsey went to sleep, which seems unlikely, this seems to be information worth waking him for. Halsey’s staff offered evidence that that information was known.
The fact is well documented in numerous command diaries, that several other offices questioned Halsey’s choice to take his entire available fleet north, leaving the San Bernardino Straight unguarded:
Admiral Bogen operated a night patrol force that was over the straight and the Sibuyan Sea. They were tracking and reporting on the Center Force. They tracked them headed directly towards the straight. One of these reports came in at 6:35pm. Bogen had several reports over time, confirming this. This was sent via radio to the Command Bridge of the New Jersey. Bogen suggested Task Force 34 and one carrier group, his own, be left behind. He was brushed off.
Admiral Lee, the planned commander of the line of Task Force 34 also tried to reach Halsey regarding the information about the Center Force headed into the straight. The command bridge of the New Jersey also brushed Adm Lee off.
Ralph Davidson and Jim Russell, both commanders also noted with one another and in their logs that they felt a great error was being made. They considered contacting Adm Mitschner, but chose not to.
Arleigh Burke asked for permission from Mitschner to radio the New Jersey to tell them that the Northern Force was an obvious decoy to lure Halsey away from the straight. Mitschner agreed with Burke that it was a decoy but he wasn’t inclined to disturb Halsey.
Burke and Operations officer Jim Flatley later awoke Mitschner to again ask for permission to contact the New Jersey to point out the Japanese had turned on the navigation lights in the straight. Since Mitschner’s team had received that information from the same communications Halsey’s staff received, Halsey had the same information. Mitschner chose not to second guess his superior.
Halsey had not consulted the 3rd fleet intelligence officers in regards to his decisions and they were convinced that the northern force was a decoy. Mike Cheek the fleet intelligence officer argued ‘furiously’ with Doug Moulton of Halsey’s staff, including yelling, that the Northern Force was a decoy to leave the straight open. Moulton was ‘unmoved’.
Cheek later took his case up the chain of command to Mick Carney. Carney was unwilling to wake Halsey and felt that this information was known and would not deter Halsey.
All of these are to illustrate that there was a lot of room for doubt in Halsey’s informed choice to go north. There was much room for alternate views and that it was reported by Halsey’s staff that the information that many saw that indicated that the Center Force was continuing into the straight, was information Halsey had. If we are to believe Halsey’s own staff, Halsey chose to go north leaving the straight open.
Let me say that again:
Halsey’s own staff reported that the information from the Sibuyan Sea was known. Halsey chose to go north with his entire force leaving the San Bernardino Straight unguarded.
His orders were to attack the Japanese fleet if it presented itself. It did. Halsey was to be offensive, not defensive. However, he had already been attacking the Center Force with his aircraft on the 24th. His were not the only flight groups to do so but he was in a defensive roll already. His own night flights of scouts were watching the center force. He had assumed a role in defense.
His broadcast to fleet headquarters and Pacific command of his intent to form task Force 34, was documented all over the Pacific and in Washington. He claimed a command role in the defense of the straight. His second order issued only to his own fleet assumed the right and thus responsibility of forming that task force as solely his own.
Halsey’s own staff confirmed he had all the information other commanders had that led them to believe Halsey was making a mistake leaving the San Bernardino Straight unguarded. Halsey chose to go north with his entire available force with a 3-1 superiority ratio. Halsey chose to leave the San Bernardino straight unguarded, even though he had direct reports showing that the Center Force consisting originally of 32 ships, reduced some by areal attack was headed into the straight. He made this choice alone.
These actions determine that he had assumed a defensive responsibility regarding the San Bernardino Straight. He assumed that role by his own actions. This action was either in defiance of direct orders, or an expansion of them considering the developing battle. Either way, he owns 100% of that choice and its responsibility. This choice of responsibility was also not challenged by his own commander.
Admiral Halsey is directly culpable for the Center Force being able to approach Leyte Gulf.
Admiral Halsey is directly culpable for the death of at least 1,161 men of Taffy 3 and airmen of Taffy 2.
Admiral Halsey’s career was saved, by the guts and guile of Adm Sprague, Cmdr Evans and Copeland and every man on the sea, in the air and ground that supported the historic actions of that battle.
Admiral Halsey lastly owes a debt of gratitude to Adm Kurita. If he had pushed forward and kept his forces together, he would have blown through Taffy 3 with acceptable losses and entered the landing zones. If this had happened and the 18.1 inch guns of the Yamato opened up, General Mac Arthur would likely have demanded Adm Halsey’s head on a platter, and gotten it.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IT ALL:
Admiral Halsey’s WWII experience had been one of being late or sidelined.
He was hours late to Pearl Harbor and only gave chase of the Japanese fleet in the wrong direction, due to faulty intelligence.
He missed out on Midway, that many people offer as the turning point of the war in the Pacific. Not only did he miss out, but his stand-in took center stage and became a national hero for his sweeping victory.
Halsey was assigned to a desk under the command of Army General Mac Arthur for about 18 months as the US fleet held the line in the Pacific with Adms Fletcher and eventually Spruance in command of the Pacific carriers.
In that time, Adm Spruance in Halsey’s opinion, let the Japanese fleet slip away which openly frustrated Halsey. Halsey also openly stated that if given the opportunity, he would not let the same happen to him. He also openly courted that opportunity with Nimitz.
At this point you could make a fair comparison between Admiral Halsey and Captain Ahab. Admiral Halsey’s white whale being the Japanese fleet before it was totally destroyed.
The spotting of the Northern Force occurred BEFORE the spotting of or even the turn of the Center Force back to the straight. This spotting of the Northern Force was what Admiral Halsey openly hoped for and sought in the battle. I propose that no information after that could have changed his mind to take full advantage of this offering to redeem his frustration and his role in the war. No information would have changed his focus other than something, dramatic.
It is also worth noting that after the sighting report of the Northern Force, Admiral Halsey was able to sleep soundly after several days. There are many reasons for this but this siting, offered him what he sought, and thus he was able to sleep.
The transmissions of October 25th that inquired about and desperately requested the presence of Task Force 34, challenged Halsey’s focus and he started to see the big picture again. An open (uncoded) transmission seeking help was likely one of the first to embarrass him and thus break his focus. He openly showed anger in response to it. The inquiry, some say order, from his boss, Admiral Nimitz broke him. He turned his own ship, rather than sending others in his stead which he certainly had, and went back to his responsibility at San Bernardino Straight.
He could have sent any significant portion of his substantial force back, including carriers that could project force far faster, but he went himself. He had also turned Adm McCain around and sent him to assist Taffy 3, with no hope of being close enough to do so, already. So he turned his own ship around instead of sending others in his task force which he left in pursuit of the Northern Force, when he had already turned another battle group to the same mission.
Oddly, he made all of these choices instead of forming Task Force 34 as he originally stated he would, and sent them back. Task Force 34 never existed.
These choices demonstrate his own responsibility to the situation. The ironic part was, that his eventual arrival if it were still needed when he did arrive, would have likely been in attacking Kurita’s force after they had been attacking Mac Arthur’s forces, for hours. His response to the requests for help and his method of return is consistent with guilt. Guilt is only felt when one considers themselves, culpable.
Sources:
Twilight of the Gods, Ian Toll
Last stand of the Tin Can sailors, James D. Hornfischer
The Battle for Leyte Gulf, C Vann Woodward
The Battle off Samar, Robert Jon Cox
Admiral Halsey’s Battle Diary, William Halsey Jr.
Additional reading
For Crew and Country, John Wukovits
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